We examine the theoretical interrelations between equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth in a one-sector representative-agent model of endogenous growth with progressive taxation of income and productive ‡ow of public spending. We analytically show that if the demand-side e¤ect of government purchases is weaker, the economy exhibits an indeterminate balanced-growth equilibrium and belief-driven growth ‡uctuations when the tax schedule is su¢ ciently progressive or regressive. If the supply-side e¤ect of public expenditures is weaker, indeterminacy and sunspots arise under progressive income taxation. In sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian-type stabilization policies, our analysis …nds that raising the tax progressivity may destabilize an endogenously growing economy with ‡uctuations driven by agents'self-ful…lling expectations.
Introduction
Since the early 1990's, there has been an extensive literature that explores the macroeconomic e¤ects of tax policy within various endogenous growth models. As it turns out, the vast majority of previous theoretical studies postulate a constant tax rate of income, which is used to …nance government purchases of goods and services that could be "wasteful" in that they do not contribute to production or utility. 1 These assumptions, although commonly adopted for the sake of analytical simplicity, are not necessarily the most realistic vis-à-vis those observed in the data. Motivated by this gap in the existing literature, we examine a one-sector endogenous growth model with empirically-relevant characteristics in industrialized countries: progressive taxation of income and productive ‡ow of public spending. Speci…cally, this paper provides a comprehensive analytical investigation of the interrelations between tax progressivity, equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth. Our work is valuable not only for its theoretical insights, but also for its important implications about the (de)stabilization role of tax policies in an endogenously growing economy.
In this paper, we systematically study the (local) stability e¤ects of Guo and Lansing's (1998) nonlinear tax structure in a prototypical one-sector representative-agent model of endogenous growth with inelastic labor supply and productive public expenditures á la Barro (1990). 2 The Guo-Lansing taxation scheme possesses a progressive/regressive property, characterized by a single parameter, whereby the household's tax rate is an increasing/decreasing function of its taxable income relative to some baseline level. Our analyses are focused on the economy's unique balanced growth path along which output, consumption, physical capital and government spending all grow at a common positive rate. In particular, we analytically show that the relationship between indeterminacy and growth depends crucially on (i) the relative strength between the demand-side and supply-side e¤ects of government purchases, and (ii) the sign and level of the slope parameter in the tax schedule that governs its progressivity 1 See, for example, Jones and Manuelli (1990) , King and Rebelo (1990) , Rebelo (1991) , Pecorino (1993) , Hendricks (2001) , Song (2002) and Jonsson (2007) . Existing studies that consider constant income taxation and useful public expenditures include Barro (1990) , Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar (1994; 1997) , Cazzavillan (1996) , Turnovsky (1996; 1997; 1999 2 Yamarik (2001) analyzes the distortionary growth implications of a nonlinear tax schedule in a one-sector AK model of endogenous growth with useless government spending. Li and Sarte (2004) examine the growth and redistributive e¤ects of the Guo-Lansing progressive policy rule in a one-sector endogenously growing economy with heterogeneous agents and public production services.
feature. 3 If the demand-side e¤ect of public spending is weaker than its supply-side counterpart, we …nd that the economy exhibits equilibrium indeterminacy and belief-driven growth ‡uctuations under regressive income taxation or when the tax progressivity is positive and higher than a critical value. In either speci…cation, start from a particular balanced growth path, and suppose that agents become optimistic about the future of the economy. Acting upon this belief, the representative household will reduce consumption and increase investment today, which in turn lead to another dynamic trajectory. Due to a dominating supply-side e¤ect of government expenditures, the after-tax return on investment is shown to be monotonically increasing along the positively-sloped transitional path as the ratio of public spending to physical capital rises. As a result, agents' initial optimistic expectations are validated and the alternative path becomes a self-ful…lling equilibrium. By contrast, our model displays local determinacy and equilibrium uniqueness when the tax progressivity is zero, or positive but not su¢ ciently high. The above results together imply that under progressive income taxation, raising the tax progressivity can destabilize the economy by generating endogenous ‡uctuations caused by agents' animal spirits, provided the supply-side e¤ect of government purchases is stronger.
If public expenditures exert a relatively weaker impact on the economy's supply side, we …nd that the economy exhibits an indeterminate balanced-growth equilibrium under progressive income taxation. In this case, when the household deviates from the original balanced growth path because of its optimism, the equilibrium after-tax marginal product of capital is shown to be rising along the downward-sloping transitional path as the ratio of government spending to physical capital falls. On the contrary, indeterminacy and sunspots do not arise within this formulation when the taxation scheme is ‡at or regressive. These results jointly imply that in sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian-type stabilization policies, changing the tax schedule from being ‡at or regressive to progressive will magnify the business cycle and thus destabilize the economy, provided the demand-side e¤ect of government purchases is stronger.
This paper is related to recent work of Greiner (2006) who studies the growth and stability e¤ects of a progressive tax policy in an endogenously growing one-sector representative-agent economy. Our analysis di¤ers from his in three aspects. First, Greiner incorporates the stock of public capital into the …rm's production function, whereas we consider the ‡ow of productive government spending. Second, we maintain the assumption of balanced budget, whereas Greiner also examines the model with public debt. Third and most importantly, the baseline level of income in our tax schedule is set equal to output per capita on the balancedgrowth equilibrium path, whereas Greiner postulates the economy-wide average income as the benchmark. Consequently, the balanced growth path in Greiner's model is always locally determinate because of a constant equilibrium (average and marginal) tax rates. 4 By contrast, indeterminacy and sunspots may arise within our model under time-varying taxation of income in equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and analyzes the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 derives the economy's unique balanced growth path and the associated Jacobian matrix that governs its local stability properties. Section 4 analytically examines the interrelations between tax progressivity, equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth. Section 5 concludes.
The Economy
We incorporate a progressive/regressive income tax schedule á la Guo and Lansing (1998) into Barro's (1990) one-sector model of endogenous growth with productive government spending.
The economy is populated by a unit measure of identical in…nitely-lived households. Each household provides …xed labor supply and maximizes its discounted lifetime utility
where c t is consumption, > 0 denotes the subjective rate of time preference, and represents the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. Based on the empirical evidence for this preference parameter in the mainstream macroeconomics literature, our analysis is restricted to the cases with > 1. We also assume that there are no fundamental uncertainties present in the economy.
The budget constraint faced by the representative household is
where i t is gross investment, y t is output and t represents a proportional income tax rate.
Output is produced by the following Cobb-Douglas technology (Barro, 1990) :
where k t is the household's capital stock and g t is the productive service ‡ow of government spending. 5 Notice that 1 captures the degree of positive external e¤ect that public expenditures exert on the production process, and that the technology (3) exhibits constant returns-to-scale with respect to k t and g t such that sustained economic growth will arise in equilibrium. Investment adds to the stock of physical capital according to the law of motion
where 2 (0; 1) is the capital depreciation rate.
For the income tax rate, we adopt the sustained-growth version of Guo and Lansing's (1998, p.485, footnote 4) nonlinear tax structure and postulate t as
where y t denotes a benchmark level of income that is taken as given by the representative household. In our model with endogenous growth, y t is set equal to the level of per capita income on the economy's balanced growth path (BGP) whereby
parameters and govern the level and slope of the tax schedule, respectively. When > (<)0, the tax rate t is monotonically increasing (decreasing) with the household's income y t ,
i.e. agents with income above y t face a higher (lower) tax rate than those with income below 5 Alternatively, gt can be interpreted as the government's investment expenditures whereby the depreciation rate of public capital is 100%. Allowing for not-fully-depreciated public capital will introduce another state variable to our model's dynamical system. This is an extension that is worth pursuing in future research. 6 To ensure the existence of a balanced-growth equilibrium in our subsequent analyses, the household's taxable income yt in equilibrium needs to grow at the same rate as the baseline level of income y t . The constant growth rate for y t , which is the BGP level of output, will be endogenously determined through the model's equilibrium conditions (see equation 18). y t . When = 0, we recover Barro's (1990) model in which all households face the constant tax rate 1 regardless of the level of their taxable income.
With regard to the progressivity features of the above taxation scheme, we …rst note that the marginal tax rate mt , de…ned as the change in taxes paid by the household divided by the change in its taxable income, is given by
Next, we restrict the analyses to an environment with 0 < t , mt < 1 such that (i) the government does not have access to lump-sum taxes or transfers, (ii) the government cannot con…scate all productive resources, and (iii) households have incentive to provide factor services to the production process. Along the economy's balanced-growth equilibrium path where y t = y t , these considerations imply that 0 < < 1 and 1 < < 1. Moreover, to guarantee the convexity of the household's budget set, the after-tax marginal product of capital (1 mt )M P K t must be a strictly decreasing function of k t , which in turn requires that > 1 on the balanced growth path. It follows that the lower bound on the slope parameter of the tax schedule (5) is determined by
Given the postulated restrictions on and , equation (6) shows that the marginal tax rate mt is higher than the average tax rate t when > 0. In this case, the tax schedule is said to be "progressive". When = 0, the average and marginal tax rates coincide at the value 1 and the tax schedule is said to be " ‡at". When < 0, the tax schedule is "regressive".
In making decisions about how much to consume and invest over their lifetimes, agents take into account the e¤ect in which the tax schedule in ‡uences their net earnings. As a result, it is the marginal tax rate of income that will govern the household's economic decisions. The …rst-order conditions for the representative agent with respect to the indicated variables and the associated transversality conditions (TVC) are c t :
TVC : lim
where (8) equates the marginal utility of consumption to its marginal cost t , which is the Lagrange multiplier on the household's budget constraint (2) that also captures the shadow price of capital. Equation (9) is the Keynes-Ramsey condition that characterizes how the stock of physical capital evolves over time, and (10) is the transversality condition.
The government sets the income tax rate t according to (5) , and balances its budget at each point in time. Hence, the instantaneous government budget constraint is given by
Substituting (11) into the household's budget constraint (2), together with the law of motion for capital (4), yields the following aggregate resource constraint for the economy:
Balanced Growth Path
We focus on the economy's balanced growth path along which output, consumption, physical capital and government spending exhibit a common, positive constant growth rate . To facilitate the subsequent dynamic analyses, we adopt the following variable transformations:
kt and x t gt kt . Using (3), (5), and (11), the transformed variable x t can be expressed as
Per these variable transformations, the model's equilibrium conditions (with
can be collapsed into the following autonomous dynamical system:
A balanced-growth equilibrium is characterized by a pair of positive real numbers (z ; x ) that satisfy _ z t = _ x t = 0. Since y t = y t along the economy's balanced growth path, it is immediate from equation (13) that
From (14) and (16), it is then straightforward to show that
and that the common (positive) rate of economic growth on the unique BGP is given by
It follows that the growth e¤ect of tax progression is negative, i.e. @ @ < 0. When income taxation becomes more progressive as rises, the resulting after-tax rate of return on capital investment will fall, which in turn leads to a lower growth rate of output.
Analysis of Dynamics
In terms of the BGP's local dynamics, we analytically compute the Jacobian matrix J of the dynamical system (14)-(15) evaluated at (z ; x ). The determinant and trace of the Jacobian
where
The local stability property of our balanced-growth equilibrium path is determined by comparing the eigenvalues of J that have negative real parts with the number of initial conditions in the dynamical system (14)- (15), which is zero in our model economy because x t and z t are both non-predetermined jump variables. 7 As a result, the BGP displays local determinacy and equilibrium uniqueness when both eigenvalues have positive real parts. If one or two eigenvalues have negative real parts, then the BGP is locally indeterminate that can be exploited to generate endogenous growth ‡uctuations driven by agents' self-ful…lling expectations or sunspots.
Since 1 and A, z > 0, the preceding analysis shows that the interrelations between the government's tax policy rule and macroeconomic (in)stability depend on (i) the demandside e¤ect of public expenditures represented by the BGP ratio of government purchases to output, i.e. 
Non-constant Taxes and Weaker Demand-Side E¤ects of Government Spending
When 6 = 0 and 1 < 1 , the demand-side e¤ect of government spending is weaker than its supply-side counterpart, and the most-binding constraint on turns out to be a positive BGP marginal tax rate of income ( m > 0), thus = 1 . Since < , condition (22) states
With non-constant taxes and relatively weak demand-side e¤ect of public 7 As for the initial condition of consumption c0, the period-0 level of government spending g0 (a ‡ow variable) will be endogenously determined through the model's equilibrium conditions. It follows that both z0 = are not predetermined. 8 When = , the supply-side and demand-side e¤ects of government spending are equal. Substituting = into (19) and (20) shows that the two eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix are zero and z > 0. In this case, the economy will undergo a saddle-node bifurcation that may cause the hard loss of stability, i.e. the disappearance of the balanced growth path.
expenditures, the economy's balanced-growth equilibrium exhibits local indeterminacy and belief-driven growth ‡uctuations under (i) regressive income taxation with 1 < < 0 and > 0; or (ii) when the tax schedule is "su¢ ciently" progressive with^ < < 1 and < 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
When the tax schedule is "relatively" less progressive with 0 < <^ and thus > 0 (see equation 21) , we …nd that both eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix J have positive real parts (Det > 0 and T r > 0), indicating the presence of local determinacy and equilibrium uniqueness. In this speci…cation, when households become optimistic and decide to raise their investment expenditures today, the mechanism described in the Appendix that makes for multiple equilibria, i.e. an increase in the equilibrium after-tax marginal product of capital, will generate divergent trajectories away from the original balanced growth path. This implies that given the initial capital stock k 0 , the period-0 levels of the household's consumption c 0 as well as the government's productive spending g 0 are uniquely determined such that the economy immediately jumps onto its balanced-growth equilibrium (z ; x ), and always stays there without any possibility of deviating transitional dynamics. As a consequence, equilibrium indeterminacy and endogenous growth ‡uctuations can never occur in this setting.
Non-constant Taxes and Stronger Demand-Side E¤ects of Government Spending
When 6 = 0 and 1 > 1 , government spending exerts a relatively stronger impact on the economy's demand side, and the most-binding constraint on is that the equilibrium after-tax return on investment is monotonically decreasing in physical capital, hence = 1 .
Next, substituting > into (22) Proof. See the Appendix.
When the tax schedule is regressive with 1 < < 0, it can easily be shown that the Jacobian's determinant and trace are both positive (Det > 0 and T r > 0). This implies that the economy displays local determinacy, and thus any belief-driven deviation from the initial balanced-growth equilibrium (z ; x ) results in divergent trajectories that will violate the transversality condition (10) . It follows that indeterminacy and sunspots do not arise in our model under regressive income taxation provided 1 > 1 .
Constant Taxes
In this case, we recover Barro's (1990) model with a ‡at tax schedule whereby t = mt = 1 . Substituting = 0 into (15) shows that the ratio of government purchases to physical capital x t remains unchanged over time, which in turn implies that the dynamical system (14)- (15) becomes degenerate. Resolving our model with = 0 leads to the following single di¤erential equation in z t ct kt that describes the equilibrium dynamics:
which has a unique interior solution z that satis…es _ z t = 0 along the balanced-growth equilibrium path. We then linearize (23) around the BGP and …nd that its local stability property is governed by the positive eigenvalue z > 0. Consequently, our endogenously growing economy exhibits local determinacy and equilibrium uniqueness under ‡at income taxation since there is no initial condition associated with (23).
Discussion
To o¤er further insights from the preceding analyses, Figure 3 plots the combinations of (the tax progressivity) and gt yt = 1 (the BGP ratio of government spending to output) that summarize all the possibilities of our model's local dynamics. Using (5) and (6), the balanced-growth equilibrium marginal tax rate can be written as
The lower half of Figure 3 depicts that when 1 < 1 (as in section 4:1), the locus m = 0 is a downward-sloping and convex curve, and the area below is not feasible because it exhibits m < 0. Under regressive income taxation ( < 0), the zone above the locus m = 0 in the southwest quadrant displays equilibrium indeterminacy and belief-driven ‡uctuations. This …nding turns out to be qualitatively consistent with that in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe's (1997) no-growth one-sector real business cycle model in which government purchases are postulated to be wasteful or useless.
Next, along the economy's balanced growth path, equation (21) can be re-written as
We then …nd that when the tax schedule is progressive (0 < < 1), the locus = 0 is an upward-sloping and concave curve in the southeast quadrant, and that it divides the regions labeled as "deter " ( > 0) and "indet" ( < 0). This, together with the previous paragraph, implies that a shift of income taxation away from being regressive toward progressive will stabilize the economy against aggregate ‡uctuations driven by animal spirits. However, in sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian-type stabilization policies, raising the tax progressivity within the southeast quadrant transforms the BGP from being locally determinate to locally indeterminate ceteris paribus. It follows that a more progressive tax schedule may destabilize our model economy by generating endogenous growth ‡uctuations, provided the supply-side e¤ect of public expenditures is stronger.
The upper half of Figure 3 illustrates that when 1 > 1 (as in section 4:2), regressive taxation with < 0 works like a conventional automatic stabilizer which leads to local determinacy and mitigates the magnitude of business cycles. On the contrary, ‡uctuations in output growth caused by agents' self-ful…lling expectations or sunspots will occur under progressive taxation with > 0. These results jointly imply that if the demand-side e¤ect of government spending is stronger, changing the tax policy from being regressive to progressive will magnify the business cycle and thus destabilize the economy. This turns out to be exactly the opposite to what emerges in the lower half of Figure 3 , thereby highlighting the important role that the relative strength between the demand-side and supply-side impact of public expenditures plays in determining the BGP's macroeconomic (in)stability. Finally, when the taxation scheme is ‡at with = 0 (as in section 4:3), the vertical axis of Figure 3 shows that our model always exhibits local determinacy and equilibrium uniqueness.
Conclusion
This paper has systematically explored the theoretical interrelations between progressive taxation of income, equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth in a one-sector representative- . These possible extensions will allow us to examine the robustness of this paper's theoretical results and policy implications, as well as further enhance our understanding of the relationship between a progressive tax schedule and macroeconomic (in)stability in an endogenous growth model with public production services. We plan to pursue these research projects in the near future. 9 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In either case, the Jacobian's determinant is negative (Det < 0), thus the two eigenvalues are of opposite signs in their real parts. Figure 1 depicts the phase diagram for these indeterminate con…gurations. Using (14) and (15), it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium loci _ z t = 0 and _ x t = 0 are upward sloping, and that the associated positively-sloped stable arm (denoted as SS) is steeper than the _ z t = 0 locus, followed by _ x t = 0. Next, start from a particular balanced growth path characterized by (z ; x ), and suppose that agents become optimistic about the future of the economy. Acting upon this belief, households will invest more and consume less today, which in turn lead to another Figure 1 shows that for this alternative path to become a self-ful…lling equilibrium, the after-tax return on investment (1 mt )M P K t must be monotonically increasing along the transitional path SS as the ratio of government spending to physical capital x t gt kt rises. From (3), (5), (6) and (11), it can be shown that Proof of Proposition 2. Using (19) and (21), it is then straightforward to show that Det < 0 and > 0 under progressive income taxation. Figure 2 presents the phase diagram for this indeterminate formulation. As in Figure 1 , the _ x t = 0 locus is ‡atter than _ z t = 0, and the associated stable arm SS is the steepest; however, all of them are now downward sloping, indicating that z t and x t move in the opposite direction. When the household deviates from the original BGP (z ; x ) and decreases today's consumption due to its optimism about the economy's future, the resulting dynamic trajectory n z 0 t ; x 0 t o will begin at (z 0 0 ; x 0 0 ) with z 0 0 < z and x 0 0 > x . Figure 2 shows that when x t gt kt falls along the convergent transitional path SS, the equilibrium after-tax marginal product of capital (1 mt )M P K t must be rising in order to justify n z 
